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Abst ract - -A  secret sharing scheme for the prohibited structure is a method of sharing a master key 
among a finite set of participants in such a way that only certain prespecified subsets of participants 
cannot recover the master key. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect, if any subset of participants 
who cannot recover the master key obtains no information regarding the master key. In this paper, 
we propose an efficient construction of perfect secret sharing schemes for graph-based prohibited 
structures where a vertex denotes a participant and an edge does a pair of participants who cannot 
recover the master key. The information rate of our scheme is 2/n, where n is the number of 
participants. (~) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, Ito et al. [1] descr ibed a general method of secret sharing called Secret Sharing Scheme 
(SSS) which allows a master  key to be shared among a finite set of part ic ipants  in such a way 
that  only certain prespecif ied subsets of part ic ipants  can recover the master  key. Let P be the 
set of part ic ipants.  The set of all subsets of P ,  denoted by 2 P, is called the power set of P .  We 
use the notat ion X\Y  = {x I x E X and x ~ Y} to denote the difference of two sets X and Y. 
The collection of subsets of part ic ipants  that  can reconstruct the master  key in this way is called 
access structure (denoted by F). The collection of subsets of part ic ipants  that  cannot reconstruct 
the master  key is cal led prohibited structure (denoted by A)  [2]. The natura l  restr ict ion is that  r 
is monotone increasing and A is monotone decreasing, that  is, 
if A E F and A C_ B C P ,  
if A E A and B C_ A C_ P ,  
then B ~ F, 
then B E A. 
and 
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If A = 2P\F, then we say the structure (F, A) is complete [2]. In the special case where 
F = {A I A C P and IA] _> m} and A = {A ] A C P and ]A] _< m - 1}, the secret sharing 
scheme is called an (m, n)-threshold scheme [3,4], where IPI = n. Let K be the master key space 
and S be the share space. The information rate of the secret sharing scheme is defined to be 
the ratio between the master key size and the maximum size of the shares [5]. Here we use 
the notation p = log 2 ]Kl/log 21S] to denote the information rate. If a secret sharing scheme is 
to be practical, we do not want to have to distribute too much secret information as shares. 
Consequently, we want to make the information rate as high as possible. A secret sharing scheme 
is perfect if any set of participants in the prohibited structure A obtains no information regarding 
the master key [6-9]. Secret sharing schemes are classified into the following types. 
TYPE I. A secret sharing scheme for the access structure r' is a method of sharing a master key 
among a finite set of participants in such a way that only subsets of participants in F can recover 
the master key while other subsets cannot. That is, A(= 2P\F) is implied. 
TYPE II. A secret sharing scheme for the prohibited structure A is a method of sharing a master 
key among a finite set of participants in such a way that only subsets of participants in A cannot 
recover the master key while other subsets can. That is, F(= 2P\A) is implied. 
TYPE III. A secret sharing scheme for the mixed structure (F, A) is a method of sharing a master 
key among a finite set of participants in such a way that subsets of participants in F can recover 
the master key, but subsets of participants in A cannot recover the master key. That is, the 
privileges of subsets in 2P\(F U A) can be ignored. Any subset of participants in 2P\(F U A) may 
either recover the master key or not. Note that, here F N A = O, and F U A C 2 P. 
Given any access tructure F, Ito et al. [1,8] showed that there exists a perfect secret sharing 
scheme to realize the structure. Benaloh and Leichter [10] proposed a different algorithm to 
realize secret sharing schemes for any given monotone access structure. In both constructions, 
the information rate decreases exponentially as a function of n, the number of participants. 
There are several performance and efficiency measures proposed for analyzing secret sharing 
schemes [5,11-14]. Their goal is to maximize the information rate of a secret sharing scheme. 
Brickell and Stinson [5] studied a perfect secret sharing scheme for graph-based access structure F
where the monotone-increasing access tructure F contains the pairs of participants corresponding 
to edges (the prohibited structure is implied to be the collection of subsets of participants corre- 
sponding to any independent set of the graph). They proved that, for any graph G with n vertices 
having maximum degree d, there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme for the access tructure 
based on G in which the information rate is at least 2/(d + 3). Stinson [14] improved the general 
result that there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme realizing access tructure based on G in 
which the information rate is at least 2/(d + 1). After that, van Dijk [12] showed that Stinson's 
lower bound is tight because he proved that there exist graphs having maximum degree d such 
that the optimal information rate is at most 2/(d + 1 - e), for all d _> 3 and E > 0. Secret shar- 
ing schemes for mixed structures (F, A) proposed by Shieh and Sun in 1994 [15] were based on 
the graph where F contains the pairs of participants corresponding to edges and A contains the 
pairs of participants corresponding to nonedges. The information rate of their scheme is 1/(2n), 
where n is the number of participants. In 1996, Sun and Shieh [16] improved the information 
rate of the secret sharing scheme to be 1/(n - 1). 
In this paper, we study the perfect secret sharing scheme for a prohibited structure based on 
the graph where the monotone-decreasing prohibited structure A contains all participants and 
the pairs of participants corresponding to edges (the access tructure is implied to be the union of 
{A [ A C P and IA[ _> 3} and the pairs of participants corresponding to nonedges of the graph). 
We propose an efficient perfect secret sharing scheme for the graph-based prohibited structure. 
The information rate of our scheme is 2/n, where n is the number of participants. Our scheme 
can be applied to the reduction of storage and computation loads on the key distribution server 
in a secure network. 
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries which will be used 
later on to construct the perfect secret sharing schemes of graph-based prohibited structures. In 
Section 3, we propose a construction of perfect secret sharing schemes for graph-based prohibited 
structures. An example of a perfect secret sharing scheme for the graph-based prohibited struc- 
ture is demonstrated in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the application of our construction. 
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6. 
2. PREL IMINARIES  
2.1. Per fect  (m, n) Thresho ld  Schemes 
The (m, n) threshold schemes were introduced by Blakley and Shamir in 1979 [3,4]. The main 
idea underlying an (m,n)  threshold scheme is to divide the master key K into n shares Si's 
corresponding to n participants (1 < i < n) in such a way that the master key K cannot be 
reclaimed unless m shares are collected. Apparently, the (m, n) threshold scheme is the special 
case of secret sharing schemes when the qualified subsets of participants are all subsets whose 
order are larger than or equal to m and the nonqualified subsets of participants are all subsets 
whose order are less than or equal to rn - 1. 
A secret sharing scheme is perfect if any unqualified subset of participants provides no infor- 
mation about the shared secret K [6,8]. It means that the prior probability p(K  = Ko) equals 
the conditional probability p(K  = Ko given any or less secret shares of an unqualified set). By 
using the entropy function H from [6,7,9], we can state the requirements for an (m, n) threshold 
scheme as follows: 
(1) H(K  I S i , , . . . ,S~,~ ) =0;  
(2) H(K  [ S~,, . . .  ,Si , ,_ l)  = H(K)  
for an arbitrary set of m indices { i l , . . .  ,ira} from {1,... ,n}. 
As an example, we review the (m, n) threshold scheme proposed by Shimir [4] as follows. 
We assume that the master key K is taken randomly from GF(q). Therefore, H(K)  = log q. 
Let f (x )  = am_iX m-1 +. . .  + al x + K (rood q) be a polynomial of degree m - 1 over the finite 
field GF(q). The n share S~'s are computed from f (x )  as follows: 
Si = f( i)(mod q), i = 1 , . . . ,n .  
Obviously, given any m secret shares S~, . . . ,  S~,,, { i l , . . . ,  ira} C {1, . . . ,  n}, f (x )  can be recon- 
structed from the Lagrange interpolating polynomial as follows [6]: 
Thus, the master key K can be obtained by f(O). On the other hand, given any m - 1 secret 
shares Si~ , . . . , Si,~_ ~ , { i l , . . .  , i ra- l} C {1,... , n } , f ( O ) can be written as follows: 
f(0) = a + S~.,. b(mod q), 
where 
a= E Si~" ~-k -~)  and b= H (r,~--'ij'--)' 
k=l j f l j#k  j=l 
Because S~,~ is uniformly distributed over GF(q) ,H(K  [ S i l , . . . ,S~_ I )  = H(f(O) I &l, 
. . . ,  S~,,,_ ~ ) = H ( a + S~,,, • b) = H ( S~,,, ) = logq = H ( K).  Therefore, the (re, n) threshold scheme 
is perfect. 
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2.2. Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes for Mixed Structures (r, A) 
In this section, we give a construction of perfect secret sharing schemes for mixed structures 
(F, A), where F = {P} and A = {A [ A C_ P and [A[ < [P[ - 2}. The secret sharing scheme 
will be used later on to construct the perfect secret sharing schemes for graph-based prohibited 
structures. 
We assume that the master key K = (K1,K2) is taken randomly from GF(q) x GF(q). It is 
clear that H (K) = 2 log q. Let f (x) = an- 1 x n- 1 +. . .  + a2x2 + K1 x + 1(2 (mod q) be a polynomial 
of degree n - 1 over the finite field GF(q). The n shares Sz's are computed from f (x )  as follows: 
Si = f( i)(mod q), i = 1 , . . . ,n .  
Obviously, given n secret shares S~, i = 1, . . . ,  n, f(x) can be reconstructed from the Lagrange 
interpolating polynomial as follows [6]: 
f (x)  = Sk. (mod q). 
k--1 j= l , j~k  
Thus, the master key K can be obtained from f (x) .  On the other hand, given any n - 2 secret 
shares S~1,..., S~._2, {Q, . . . ,  in-2} c {1,. . . ,  n}, we can get the following relations: 


















Because there are n unknown variables, an- l , . . . ,  a2, K1, K2, among these n - 2 equations, 
it is clear that the total number of possible solutions for K = (K1,/(2) is q2. Hence, H(K  J 
S~1,..., Si,_2) = H(K1,K2 J S~I, . . . ,Si ,_2) = 21ogq = H(K) .  Therefore, the secret sharing 
scheme for the mixed structure (F, A) is perfect. 
3. CONSTRUCTION OF  PERFECT SSS  FOR 
PROHIB ITED STRUCTURES BASED ON GRAPHS 
Let P be the set of participants, and G be a graph where a vertex denotes a participant 
in P and an edge denotes a pair of participants• In a perfect secret sharing scheme for the 
prohibited structure based of G, a pair of participants corresponding to an edge of G cannot obtain 
any information regarding the master key. In addition, we also assume that each participant 
corresponding to a vertex of G cannot obtain any information regarding the master key. This 
is because that if one participant is allowed to recover the master key by himself, we can assign 
the master key as his share and remove him from the graph G. The graph we consider here may 
include disconnected graphs and isolated vertices. A participant corresponding to an isolated 
vertex can be interpreted as that he can recover the master key in cooperation with any participant 
in the graph except himself. We use E(G) to denote the set of edges of G; E(G) to denote the 
set of edges of G, where G is the complement of G; S to denote the set of pairs of participants 
corresponding to edges in E(G); R to denote the set of pairs of participants corresponding to 
edges in E(G). It is reasonable to restrict hat the prohibited structure and the access tructure 
are monotone• Thus, given a graph G, the prohibited structure is denoted by A = {A I A C 
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P and IA I = 1} U {A I A • S}, and then the access tructure is decided by 2P\A = {A IA c_ 
Pand lA I>3}U{AIA•R}.  
In the following, we will use the conventional threshold schemes [3,4] to construct he perfect 
secret sharing schemes for graph-based prohibited structures. We assume that all computations 
are over GF(q) where q is a prime. 
Given a graph G for the prohibited structure, a perfect secret sharing scheme is constructed 
as follows. Assume that P = {Pl,p2,. . .  ,P,,} is the set of participants corresponding to the 
vertices of the graph G. We first construct n + 1 conventional (2, n)-threshold schemes [3,4], 
named TS1, TS2 . . . .  , and TSn+I. To avoid ambiguity, we call the master key and the shares 
of each TSi  submaster key and subshares, respectively. For each (2, n) - TSi,  let Ski be its 
submaster key and si,1, si ,2,. . . ,  si,n be its n subshares. Thus, given any two subshares, si,j and 
si,k(1 _< j < k < n), the submaster key Ski can be recovered, but less than two subshares provide 
no information about Ski. 
The master key of the secret sharing scheme for the prohibited structure based on the graph G 
is given by K = (K1, K2), which is protected by these submaster keys Ski,  Sk2 , . . . ,  Skn, ,~kn+l in 
such a way that all n + 1 submaster keys Ski,  Sk2, . . . ,  Skn, Skn+l collected together, the master 
key K can be recovered, but any n - 1 or less submaster keys provide no information regarding 
the master key. It is easy to construct such protection mechanism following the method proposed 
in Section 2.2. 
The share of participant pi is given by Si = (ai,1,..., a i , t , . . . ,  ai,n, aim+i), where 1 < t < n+ 1, 
ai,t is empty 
ai,t = St,i 
ai,t = Skt 
ai,t = St,i 
a~,t =Skt  
if t = i, 
if t = n + 1 and Pt is an isolated vertex, 
if t = n + 1 and Pt is not an isolated vertex, 
i f t~ i ,  t~n+l ,  and pipt is an edge of G, 
if t ~ i, t ~ n + 1, and pipt is not an edge of G. 
Thus, the constructed secret sharing scheme satisfies: 
(1) if A E S, A obtains no information regarding the master key, 
(2) if A C P and [A[ = 1, A obtains no information regarding the master key, 
(3) if A E R, A can recover the master key, 
(4) if A C_ P and [A I > 3, A can recover the master key. 
THEOREM 1. / f  A E S, A obtains no information regarding the master key of the constructed 
secret sharing scheme for the prohibited structure based on the graph G. 
PROOF. We assume that A = {pi,pj}, where i ¢ j. The share ofpi is Si = (ai,l,ai,2,... ,ai,n+l) 
and the share o fp j  is Sj = (aj, l ,aj,2,.. . ,aj,n+l). Because A • S, Pipj is an edge of G. We 
conclude that for any t, 1 < t < n + 1, one of the following four cases holds. 
(1) ai,t =Skt  and aj,t =Skt  if t = n+ 1, 
(2) ai,t = empty and aj,t = st j  if t = i, 
(3) ai,t = st,i and aj,t = empty if t = j,  
(4) ai,t = st# or Skt, and aj,t = std or Skt it t ¢ n + 1,t ~ i, and t ¢ j. 
In Cases (1) and (4), the submaster key Skt can be recovered. In Case (2), ai,i and ai,i 
can obtain only one subshare si,j of the (2, n) - TSi. Therefore, Pi and pj get no information 
about the submaster key Ski. In Case (3), a~,j and aj,j can obtain only one subshare sj# of the 
(2, n) - TS  i. Therefore, Pi and pj get no information about the submaster key Ski.  Hence, Pi 
and pj can obtain only n - 1 submaster keys which provide no information regarding the master 
key K. | 
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THEOREM 2. / f  A C P and [A[ = 1, A obtains no information regarding the master key of the 
constructed secret sharing scheme for the prohibited structure based on the graph G. 
PROOF. This means the case that each participant obtains no information regarding the master 
key. We assume that A -- {Pi} and the share ofp i  is Si = (ai, l ,ai,2,.. .  ,ai,n+l). I fp i  is not an 
isolated vertex, then there exists a vertex pj such that Pipj is an edge of G. From Theorem 1, we 
know that {Pi, Pj } obtains no information regarding the master key. Therefore, A = {Pi} obtains 
no information regarding the master key. 
If pi is not an isolated vertex, we conclude that for any, t, 1 < t < n + 1, one of the following 
three cases holds. 
(1) ai,t = st# if t = n + l; 
(2) ai,t = empty if t = i; 
(3) ai,t =Skt  if t ~ n + 1, t ~ i. 
In Cases (1) and (2), Pi gets no information about the submaster key Skn+l and Ski. Hence, Pi 
can obtain only n - 1 submaster keys which provide no information regarding the master 
key K. 1 
THEOREM 3. If A 6 R, A can recover the master key of the constructed secret sharing scheme 
for the prohibited structure based on the graph G. 
PROOF. We assume that A = {pi,pj}, where i ¢ j .  The share ofpi is Si = (ai,1, ai ,2, . . . ,  ai,n+l) 
and the share of pj is Sj = (ai,1, a33.,..., aj,n+l). Because A E R, PiPj is an nonedge of G. We 
conclude that for any t, 1 < t < n + 1, one of the following three cases holds. 
(1) ai,t = empty and aj,t = Skt if t = i; 
(2) ai,t : Skt and aj, t = empty if t = j; 
(3) ai,t = st# or Skt, and aj,t : 8t,j or  Skt  if t ~ i, and t ~ j. 
In Cases (1)-(3), the submaster key kt can be recovered. Thus, participant Pi and participant pj 
can recover all n + 1 submaster keys Ski, Sk2, . . . ,  Skn+l, and hence, the master key K. | 
THEOREM 4. iT/A C P and [A[ > 3, A can recover the master key of the constructed secret 
sharing scheme for the prohibited structure based on the graph G. 
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we assume that A = {Pi,Pi,Pk}, where i, j ,  and k are 
distinct. If there exists a pair of participants of A belongs to R, then the master key can be 
recovered from Theorem 3. All we need to consider is the case that all PiPj, PiPk, and PiPk are 
edges of G. From Theorem 1, we know that Pi and pj can recover all submaster keys except Ski 
and Ski. Similarly, Pi and Pk can recover all submaster keys except Ski and Skk. Also, pj and Pk 
can recover all submaster keys except Ski and Skk. Therefore, Pi,Pj, and Pk can recover all 
submaster keys Ski, Sk2, . . . ,  Skn+l, and hence, the master key K. l 
The share of participant pi(= (ai,1,..., ai ,t , . . . ,  ai,n, ai,,~+l)) is an (n + 1)-dimensional vector. 
Except that ai,i is empty, every ai,j is over GF(q). Therefore, the size of the share is qn. Because 
the master key K is equal to (K1, K2), the size of the master key space is q2. It is clear that 
the information rate of our secret sharing scheme for the graph-based prohibited structure is 
log q2/log q~ -- 2/n, where n is the number of participants. 
4. AN EXAMPLE OF PERFECT SSS 
FOR A PROHIB ITED STRUCTURE 
We demonstrate the use of our method in the following example. In Figure 1, the graph G 
denotes the prohibited structure with six participants. Therefore, E(G) = {PiPs, PiPs, P2Ps, P2Ps, 
P3Ps, p3Ps } and E(-G) = {piP2, PIP4, PiPs, P2P3, P2P4, P3P4, P4Ps, P4P6, PsP6 }. The secret sharing 
scheme for the prohibited structure based on the graph G is constructed as follows. Let P = 
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Figure 1. Graph G with six participants. 
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{Pl, P2, P3, P4, Ps, P6 }. Thus, 
S = {{Pl ,P3},{Pl ,P5},{P2,P5},{P2,R6},{R3,P5},{R3,P6}}, and
R= 
The prohibited structure 
A= ~¢~p1}~p2}~p3}~p4}~{p5}~p6}~pbp3}~{p1~p5}~p2~p5}~{p2~p6~p3~p~}'~p3~p6}}. 
The access structure 
F : {{R I ,p2} ,{P l ,P4} ,{R I ,P6} ,{P2 ,p3},{p2,p4},{P3 ,R4},{R4,P5} ,{p4,P6}{R5,P6) ,  
{Pl,P2,P3},{Pl,P2,P4},{Pl,P2,PS},{BI,P2,P6},{Pl,P3,P4},{Pl,P3,Ps}, 
{P2,P3,P6},{P2,Pa,PS},{P2,P4,R6},{P2,P~,P6},{P3,P4,PS},{P3,P4,P6}, 
{Pl, P2, P4, P5 }, {Pl, P2, P4, P6 }, {Pl, P2, PS, P6 }1 {Pl, P3, P4, P5 }, {Pl, P3, P4, P6 }, 




p6},{pl,v4,ps,p6},{ ,p3,v4,vs},{p2,p3,v4,v6},{v2,p3,vs,p }, 
P6}, {P3,P4,Ps,P6}, {Pl,P2,P3,P4,Ps}, {Pl,P2,P3,P4,P6}, 
Ps,P6},{Pl,P2,Pa,Ps,P6},{Pl,P3,P4,Ps,P6},{P2,P3,P4,Ps,P6}, 
Let TS1, TS2, . . . ,  and TS7 be seven (2,6)-threshold schemes. We assume that Ski is the 
submaster key of TSi and s~,l, si,2,... ,  and si,6 are the subshares of TSi, for 1 < i < 7. Here we 
use Shamir's method [4] to construct hese threshold schemes. For each (2, 6) - TSi, let 
f i(x) = ri . x + Ski(mod q) 
be a secret polynomial of degree 1 over the finite field GF(q), where q is a prime. Let IDj  denote 
the identity of the participant pj. The six subshares i,1,...,si,6 are computed from f~(x) as 
follows: 
si,j = f i ( IDj)(mod q), j = 1 . . . .  ,6. 
Obviously, given any two subshares, si,j and si,k, f i(x) can be reconstructed from the Lagrange 
interpolating polynomial as follows [6]: 
(x - IDk) (x - IDj)  (mod q). 
f i(x) = si,~ . (ID~ - IDk) + si,k . (IDk - IDa) 
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Thus, the submaster key Ski(= f~(0)) can be obtained, but less than two subshares provide no 
information about the submaster key. 
The master key of the secret sharing scheme is given by K = (K1, K2) which is protected by 
these submaster keys Ski, Sk2,... ,Sk7 in such a way that all seven submaster keys collected 
together, the master key K can be recovered, but any five or less submaster keys provide no 
information regarding the master key (see Section 2.2.). The shares of participants are given by: 
S1 = (--, Sk2, s3,1, Sk4, s5,1, Sks, SkT) 
$2 = (Ski,--, Sk~, Sk4, s5,2, s6,2, SkT) 
$3 = <s1,3, Sk2,--, Sk4, s5,3, s6,3, SkT> 
$4 = (Ski, Sk2, Sk3,--, Sk5, Sks, 87,4) 
$5 = (s,,s, s2,5, s3,5, Sk4,--, Sks, Sk~> 
$6 = (Ski, s2,6, s3,6, Sk4, Sks,--, SkT> where '-- ' ,  denotes empty entry. 
In the following, we demonstrate he constructed secret sharing scheme satisfies: 
(1) if A E S, A obtains no information regarding the master key; 
(2) if A C_ P and [A[ = 1, A obtains no information regarding the master key; 
(3) if A E R, A can recover the master key; 
(4) if A C_ P and [A[ > 3, A can recover the master key. 
If A --- {Pl,P3} E A, A cannot recover Ski and Sk3. Therefore, A obtains no information 
about the master key K. 
If A = {P4} E A, A cannot recover Sk4 and SkT. Therefore, A obtains no information about 
the master key K. 
If A -- {Pl,p2} E F, A can recover the master key K as follows. 
(1) Participant PI can obtain Sk2, Sk4, Sks, and Sk7 because he owns his share $1. 
(2) Participant P2 can obtain Ski, Sk3, Sk4, and Sky because he owns his share $2. 
(3) Participants Pl and P2 can recover Sk5 from as,1 of S1 and s5,2 of $2. 
Therefore, participants Pl and P2 can recover all seven submaster keys, and hence, the master 
key K. 
If A = {Pl,P3,Ps} E F, A can recover the master key K as follows. 
(1) Participant Pl can obtain Sk2, Sk4, Sks, and Sk7 because he owns his share $1. 
(2) Participants P3 and Ps can recover Ski from Sl,3 of $3 and sl,s of Ss. 
(3) Participants Pl and Ps can recover Sk3 from s3,1 of S1 and s3,s of $5. 
(4) Participants Pl and P3 can recover Sks from ss,1 of $1 and s5,3 of $3. 
Therefore, participants Pl, P3, and Ps can recover all seven submaster keys, and hence, the 
master key K. 
5. APPL ICAT ION 
Our secret sharing scheme for graph-based prohibited structures can be employed in many 
applications in various areas, such as secure communication networks, and secure databases. It is 
particularly useful for access control (e.g., reading a file, or sending a message) in an environment 
where the number of participants is large, such as a large secure network. Consider a network 
system with n participants, where an access control policy is enforced by a Communication 
Granting Server (CGS) to restrict the communication between participants. A secure session key 
will be issued unless the sender requesting the key is allowed to communicate with the receiver. 
The access control matrix employed in conventional access control mechanisms can be used by 
the CGS to achieve the goal [17]. However, the CGS needs to store and search the large access 
control matrix of size O(n2). This size of information causes heavy storage and computation 
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loads on the CGS when n is large. In the worst case, the storage and computat ion loads may 
make this design impractical. 
In contrast, the secret sharing scheme for graph-based prohibited structures is more efficient. 
We can transform the communication relationships into a graph, where a vertex denotes a par- 
t icipant and an edge does an illegal communication. In the network system, each participant 
holds a secret (e.g., his password). The secret can be transformed into the corresponding share 
in the secret sharing scheme by the communication granting server. The transformation eeds 
to be one-way so that  it is computational ly infeasible to compute the secret from the share. Two 
participants present heir secrets to the CGS when attempting to communicate. If the two corre- 
sponding shares generated by the two secrets can successfully determine the master key, the CGS 
will return a session key to both participants. This session key will be used as both encryption 
and decryption keys for future communication between these two participants. In the scheme, 
the CGS need not maintain a large access control matrix, but only needs to keep a single master 
key. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we give a construction of perfect secret sharing schemes for mixed structures 
(F, A), where F = (P}  and A = (A  [ A C_ P and IAI <_ IPI - 2). Based on the proposed perfect 
secret sharing schemes, we propose an efficient construction of a perfect secret sharing scheme 
for graph-based prohibited structures where a vertex denotes a participant and an edge denotes 
a pair of participants who cannot recover the master key. The information rate of our scheme is 
2/n,  where n is the number of participants. We also present an application of our scheme to the 
reduction of storage and computat ion loads on the communicat ion  granting server in a secure 
network. 
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